A. About the Order of Origin of Intelligibles

71. Speaking first, then, of the order of origin, one must look first at actual cognition, second at habitual cognition.

[About actual cognition]. As to the first I premise two things, the first of which is that a concept simply simple is a concept that is not resoluble into more concepts, as the concept of being or of ultimate difference. Now I call a simple concept, but not a simply simple concept, whatever can be conceived by the intellect in an act of simple intelligence, though it could be resolved into further concepts that are separately conceivable.

72. I premise, second, that it is one thing to understand something confused and another to understand confusedly. For the confused is the same as the indistinct, and just as there are two possible distinguishings relative to the issue at hand (namely of the essential whole into its essential parts and of the universal whole into its subjective parts), so there are two non-distinguishings, namely of the two aforesaid wholes relative to their parts. A thing confused, then, is understood when something is understood that is not distinct in either of the aforesaid ways. But something is said to be understood confusedly when it is conceived as it is expressed by the name, distinctly when it is conceived as it is expressed by the definition.

73. Taking these points as understood to begin with, I set down first the order of origin, in actual knowledge, of things understood confusedly. And thereon I say that the first thing actually known confusedly is the most specific species, a singular instance of which moves the senses more effectively and more strongly first,a and this on the supposition that the instance is present to the senses in the proportion due. Hence if you posit some case in which the senses do not sense first the specific nature (as that it is not at once apparent whether a color is reddish or green), and consequently a case in which the intellect would not, by that sensation, immediately apprehend the specific nature, I always posit an undue proportion of the singular to the senses - either because of an imperfection in the sense power, which this visibility exceeds (the visibility of a nature of this sort as it is a nature), or because of a defect in the medium (of light or something of the sort), or because the thing is too far distant.

a.a [Interpolated text, from Lectura I d.3 n.70] whether it is audible or visible or tangible. For the species of whatever individual moves the senses more strongly is known first with confused knowledge.

74. Hereby is plain an answer to the following objection: ‘two eyes are at the same distance from something red, one of which immediately perceives the redness, the other confusedly; therefore the specific nature is not at once sensed when there is the right proportion - Response: the right proportion for one eye is not the right proportion for the other eye, because of a lack of proportion in the eye acted on.

75. On the contrary: if [the object] generates a species of red up to point a, and beyond point a generates a species of color or a color confusedly representing red, then, if the eyes are beyond a, neither eye will see the red distinctly. - Response: whatever holds of the medium (whether the proper species is in it everywhere or a confused species beyond a certain distance), at least in a less well disposed eye, other things being equal, the species will be more confused, at any rate beyond a determinate distance.a

a.a [Text canceled by Scotus] in place of ‘whatever holds.. .determinate distance’: whatever singular could not be understood under its proper idea (about which elsewhere [Ord. II d.3 p.1 aa.5-6, n.17, p.2 q.1 n.15, q.2 n.9]), for the present I am speaking about those things that, according to the common opinion, it is certain can be understood [n.348].

76. I prove the proposed conclusion as follows [n.73]: a natural cause, when it is not impeded, acts for its effect according to the utmost of its power; therefore it acts first for the most perfect act that it can first produce. All the things that come together for this first act of the intellect are natural causes merely, because they precede all act of the will -and they are not impeded, as is plain. Therefore they produce first the most perfect concept they are capable of; but that concept is only the species of the most specific produced thing. But if some other concept, namely the concept of something more common, were the most perfect that they were capable of, then, since a concept of what is more common is more imperfect than the concept of the most specific species (as a part is more imperfect than the whole), it would follow that they would not be capable of a concept of the species, and so they would never cause that concept.

77. Second as follows, because (Avicenna, Metaphysics 1 ch.3) metaphysics is last in the order of teaching.     Therefore , the principles of all other sciences, and their terms, can be conceived before the principles of metaphysics. But this would not be the case if it were necessary for the more common concepts to be conceived first before the concepts of the most specific species; for then being and the like would have to be conceived first, and so it would follow rather that metaphysics was first in the order of teaching; therefore etc     .

78. Third, because if it were necessary to conceive the more universal concepts first before the concept of such and such species, then, since the senses are posited to be in act about the singular that moves the senses, and the intellect is free of this, a long time would have to be posited before the species of this sort of first sensed singular was conceived; for it would first be necessary to understand, in order, all the common predicates said of the ‘what’ of the species.a

a.a [Interpolated text, from Lectura I d.3 n.74] From this is evident the reason why the intellect understands one concept before another, although the species of several of them are present to it. For this does not come from the will (since then the intellect would not possess its [own] act of understanding), but the reason is of this sort, that the singular of one moves the senses more strongly than the singular of another. - This about confused knowledge.

79. As to the first of these three reasons [n.76], note that the order in the case of generations that proceed through the imperfect as intermediary is here the response -otherwise a definitive concept would be caused by the object first of all (for the object is capable of that), or there will never be a cause of it.

Why is a definitive concept not caused first? What perfection does any cause of that concept acquire through discursive reasoning, through division, etc.? - Response: a definitive concept is a concept explicative of several partial concepts, so each of these must be understood first - first in nature at least, and for us first in time, because a single concept is made known to us through its parts.

80. I speak, secondly [n.69], about the actual knowledge of things distinctly conceived - and I say that this is the converse of the general concept, because the first thing thus conceived is the most common, and those closer to it are prior and those further away are posterior.

I prove this as follows: because from the second premise [n.72] nothing is distinctly conceived except when everything is conceived that is present in its essential idea; being is included in all lower quidditative concepts; therefore no lower concept is distinctly conceived unless being is conceived. Now being can only be distinctly conceived because it has a simply simple concept. It can therefore be distinctly conceived without the others, and the others not distinctly conceived without it having been distinctly conceived. Therefore being is the first concept that is conceivable distinctly. From this follows that what is closer to being is prior, because knowing distinctly is obtained through the definition, and the definition is acquired by way of division, starting from being and proceeding to the concept of the defined thing. Now, in the case of division, the prior concepts occur first, as genus and difference, wherein a more common concept is distinctly conceived.

81. Second I prove that metaphysics (according to Avicenna as cited before [n.77]) is first in the order of knowing distinctly, because it has to certify the principles of the other sciences; therefore its knowables are the first distinctly knowable things. Nor does Avicenna contradict himself in the fact that he makes it last in the order of teaching and first in knowing distinctly. For (as was plain from the question about propositions known self-evidently through themselves [Ord.1 d.2 n.19]) the principles of the other sciences are known self-evidently on the basis of a confused concept of the terms; but when metaphysics is known, there is afterwards the possibility of investigating the quiddity of the terms distinctly. And in this way are the terms of the special sciences not conceived, and their principles not understood, prior to metaphysics. Thus, too, can many things be clear to metaphysico-geometry that were not known to geometry previously from its confused concept. An example: a geometer qua geometer uses for his self-evident principles only those that are evident at once from the sort of confused concept of the terms that comes from sensibles, as that ‘a line is a length’ etc., without caring what genus line belongs to, as whether it is substance or quantity. But now, after geometry and the other special sciences are known, metaphysics about the common concepts follows, and from these common concepts a return can be made, by way of division, to an investigating of the quiddities of the terms in the (already known) special sciences. And then, from the quiddities thus known, the principles of the special sciences are known more distinctly than before. Also known are many principles that were not known before from the confusedly known terms. And in this way is it plain how metaphysics is first and how it is not first.

82. But, when comparing the order of conceiving confusedly with the order of conceiving distinctly, I say that the whole order of conceiving confusedly is prior, and therefore what is first in that order [n.73] is simply first, and the proof of this is the aforesaid authority of Avicenna [n.77] about the order that metaphysics has to the other sciences.

83. Against this is the objection made that in Physics 1.1.184a21-22 it is said “confused things” (that is, the more universal things) “are known first”, which is plain because “children first call all men ‘father’, and later discern them individually.” Therefore, the child knows its father first under the idea of man before under the idea of this man.

84. This same fact does Avicenna prove about something seen in the distance, because someone is known first under the idea of body before that of animal, and under the idea of animal before under the idea of man, and under the idea of man before under the idea of this man.

85. This is seen too from the fact that, in the case of arguing, the way of composition is prior to the way of resolution. Therefore, so is it in the case of simple conceptions.

86. To the first [n.83] of these points [nn.83-85] I say that, as the confused is twofold, namely the ‘universal whole’ and the ‘essential whole’, so each is first in its own order. But that is simply first which is first in the order of knowing confusedly, because the natural process is from imperfect to perfect through a middle. Now knowing confusedly is a sort of middle between not knowing and knowing distinctly; and therefore knowing confusedly comes before knowing anything distinctly. - And as to what is said about the child [n.83], I concede that the species is understood first before the singular (I did say that the species is the first intelligible [nn.73-78]); but the argument does not hold of genus and species, for whiteness is conceived actually before color is in the order of confused knowledge, because color under the idea of color is not known save under the idea of a greater abstraction than the abstraction of whiteness from this whiteness; and this greater abstraction is more difficult, because from things less alike.

87. To the next point [n.84], from Avicenna, I say that when an object is not nearby in the required way it does not move [the senses] to knowing it under its most perfect idea but under an imperfect one. And then the intellection, which follows the sensing of such an object, needs to be of the sort of universal that, under the idea of the singular, the senses were of. But when the object is in the right proportion for being able to move the senses under its own proper and perfect idea, then the intellect, following such senses, has knowledge of such an object under its specific idea confusedly first before under the idea of its genus confusedly - not that the more imperfect real idea, from which the genus is taken, is the reason for moving [the senses] when the object is at a greater distance, and the more perfect idea, from which the difference is taken, is the reason for moving [the senses] when it is at a lesser distance (rather the reason for acting from a greater distance is a more effective active idea), but the specific form is the reason for its imperfectly assimilating [the senses to itself] at a great distance and for perfectly assimilating [them] at a proportionate distance. It does not follow then that the color generates no species of itself, but that it does not do so then, but only this whiteness does or this blackness - not the ‘this’ but the nature.

88. How will it be, then, with the intelligible species of the more universal and the less universal [n.61]?

It can be said that both are generated by the same phantasm.

89. Or in another way: the more universal, as it is virtually contained in a lower universal [n.365 infra], is generative of the intelligible species, because it is thus per se intelligible, not of the sensible species, because it is thus not sensible - for the senses are of the existent as it is existent.

90. Against this [n.89]: for you [sc. Scotus] the senses are not of the singular but of the nature in the singular [n.87]. Again, even if one posits a proper sensible species and a proper phantasm of whiteness and another proper to color, yet one cannot posit one proper to quality or to being, because these, in their indifference [to this or that particular], surpass the genus of sensible things, and cannot as such shine forth in a phantasm - and yet are the proper intelligible species of them caused [in the intellect]. Not caused therefore by diverse phantasms, nor by themselves as they are distinct, existing virtually there [sc. in the singular], because under these ideas they are not there in a way that represents them, nor in a way that does not represent them, as is plain [sc. because then they would not cause any idea of the more and less universal]. Therefore, the other way [sc. both are generated by the same phantasm, n.88].

91. To the third [n.85] I say that on both sides, in the case of simples [= concepts] as in that of complexes [= propositions], there is a process from what includes to what is included -. But in the case of sensibles what includes is lower, in the case of complexes what includes is the principle in respect of the conclusion.

92. [About habitual and virtual knowledge] As to habitual or virtual knowledge [n.71] I first explain what I understand by the terms.

I call knowledge ‘habitual’ when the object is present to the intellect in the idea of an intelligible in act in such a way that the intellect can immediately have an elicited act about it. I call knowledge ‘virtual’ when something is understood in a thing as a part of the thing understood first, but not as the thing understood first - as for example when ‘man’ is understood, ‘animal’ is understood in ‘man’ as part of the thing understood, but not as the thing understood first, the totality, which is the term of the act of intellection. This is properly enough called ‘the thing virtually understood’ because it is close enough to the thing actually understood; for it could not be more actually understood unless it were understood in an intellection proper to it, which would be an intellection of it as it is the first and total term.

93. As to this habitual and virtual knowledge I say that the things known first by way of generation are more common.

The proof is that just as diverse forms, which perfect the same perfectible in a certain order, are of a nature to perfect it more mediately or more immediately, so, if the same form contain virtually in itself the perfection of the ordered forms, it will perfect the perfectible in, as it were, a like order of nature - just as if the form of body, of substance, and of the rest were different forms, and if the form of substance were to inform the thing first and then the form of body     etc ., An implicit reference to the famous Tree of Porphyry, where the branches, after substance, are: material substance or body, then living body, animal, man, and finally these and those individual men. ¹¹ so, if one form virtually include all of them, it will, as it were, perfect matter first under the idea of substance before it does so under the idea of body, and always in this way of generation the more imperfect will be prior because process is made from potency to act. Therefore     , just as several concepts, more common and less common, habitual or virtual, are of a nature to perfect the intellect by way of generation, so the more imperfect concept is always prior - so if one concept virtually include all of these concepts, it will perfect under the idea of the more common and universal concept first before under the idea of a particular concept. - This as to the idea of origin or generation.

94. On the contrary: why is it not similar in the case of actual knowledge? - Reply: here [in the case of habitual knowledge, n.93] such concepts have, in their moving [of the intellect], a natural ordering, but in duration they are simultaneous; not so there [in the case of actual knowledge], but the concepts move successively and the more potent concept moves [the intellect] more strongly and prevents the others from then moving it there; not so here. When one is actually knowing an insect, like an entomologist actually studying an insect, one is knowing it under the idea of this kind of living sensitive body, for this is the more potent concept, the concept that is driving one’s actual knowing. So one is not actually knowing it under the idea of sensitive body (for then it would not be distinct from a bird) or of living body (for then it would not be distinct from a plant) or of material body (for then it would not be distinct from a stone), though of course one is not denying, whether actually or habitually, any of these realities. But when one knows an insect virtually, then included simultaneously in the concept of insect thus virtually known (though according to a certain order) are the concepts of sensitive, living, material, substance. ¹²